Husky's FCF Appears Overstated by 90% — and Both Its CEO and CFO Just Quit
Jehoshaphat Research alleges GPGI is overstating the financial performance of Husky Technologies, its $5B+ acquisition that accounts for over 70% of pro forma EBITDA, citing conflated free cash flow definitions, aggressive revenue recognition, and a governance structure that rewards acquisition volume over performance.
"Former Husky employees described aggressive accounting methods used before the GPGI acquisition, including shipping products to the company's own parking lot to justify revenue recognition."
— Jehoshaphat Research, February 2026Each report is scored across five categories to determine dashboard treatment, language assertiveness, and component inclusion. Active scores are highlighted below.
GPGI appears to be systematically overstating the financial performance of Husky Technologies, a recently acquired industrial business that represents over 70% of the combined company's pro forma EBITDA.
Jehoshaphat Research alleges Husky's free cash flow is inflated by approximately 90% through conflation of different FCF definitions, that revenue recognition practices include shipping products to the company's own parking lot, and that a self-enriching governance structure — where the chairman's family-controlled management company collects acquisition-linked fees — incentivizes aggressive deal-making over shareholder value creation. The simultaneous departure of both Husky's CEO and CFO, with no replacements identified, raises further alarm.
| Name | Role | Issue | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| David Cote | Executive Chairman, GPGI | Controls RHLD which collects acquisition-linked management fees; no performance hurdles | Conflict |
| Bradley Selleck | CEO, Husky Technologies | Departing April 2026 — weeks after acquisition closed; no replacement named | Departing |
| John Linker | CFO, Husky Technologies | Departing March 2026 — weeks after acquisition closed; no replacement named | Departing |
| Platinum Equity | Former Husky Owner (PE) | Sold Husky after owning since 2018; secured reduced 90-day lockup on 55M shares | Selling |
| Louis Samson | Platinum Equity → GPGI Board | Joined GPGI board as part of deal; PE affiliate retains board nomination rights | Installed |
| Tom Knott | RHLD Co-Lead with Cote | Co-manages Resolute Operating System deployment; benefits from fee expansion | Conflict |
"This structure materially alters the alignment between Resolute Holdings I LP and CompoSecure minority shareholders, as control is preserved regardless of dilution, while the fee stream grows with any acquisition activity."
— Value Investors Club bear thesis on RHLD, January 2026A $7 Billion Conglomerate Built on Overstated Financials, Rushed Due Diligence, and Misaligned Incentives
Jehoshaphat Research contends that GPGI's Husky Technologies acquisition — which accounts for over 70% of pro forma EBITDA — is built on financial metrics that appear systematically inflated. The simultaneous departure of both Husky's CEO and CFO within weeks of the deal closing, combined with a governance structure that pays the chairman's affiliated management company fees that grow with each new acquisition regardless of performance, creates a toxic incentive landscape. At 41.5× price-to-sales versus a peer average of 2.8×, GPGI trades at a valuation disconnected from the underlying quality of its earnings.
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