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NASDAQ:VELO06/25/2026

Morpheus Research Short Report on VELO

$20.5
Open on report
$9.67
Close on report
-52.83%
% since report

Morpheus Research on Velo3D, Inc.


Bottom Line

The allegation. Morpheus Research alleges that Velo3D's purported turnaround is an illusion driven by a virtually dead SpaceX relationship, misleadingly promoted defense contracts with little to no funded revenue, unreliable and outcompeted printing technology, and a CEO whose biography contains fabrications, shell companies, and a trail of creditor litigation.
The company. Velo3D is a California-based metal additive manufacturing company that sells Sapphire-brand laser powder-bed fusion 3D printers and is pivoting to an in-house parts production business called Rapid Production Solutions, with aerospace, defense, and space customers including historically SpaceX as its anchor.
The point. With a market cap of $537 million, a price-to-sales multiple of 10.7x representing an 858% premium to peers, seven unremediated material weaknesses, 129% share count dilution, and the CEO having pledged ~$54 million in shares as loan collateral, Morpheus Research believes the stock faces severe downside once investors recognize the promoted narratives as unsupported.

Activ8 Report Assessment

Activ8 evaluates every investigator report across three dimensions: the nature of the thesis, the type of evidence supporting it, and the catalyst for stock repricing. Scores are derived solely from the source report. New to these dimensions? Read our guide.

Thesis Classifies the nature of the investigator’s central claim. Structural/Valuation concerns overpricing or business erosion. Governance covers conflicts of interest, self-dealing, or oversight failures. Fraud/Deception involves deliberate misrepresentation, concealment, or securities violations.
Fraud / DeceptionGovernanceStructural / Valuation

Morpheus alleges deliberate deception including CEO Jeldi misrepresenting SpaceX fleet growth at a December 2025 investor conference despite SpaceX having stopped ordering printers in 2022, and fabricating his medical credentials and business track record; governance concerns include the CEO pledging 25% of his stake worth ~$54 million as private loan collateral and high executive turnover of CTO, CFO, COO, and VP of Technology; structurally, Velo trades at 10.7x price-to-sales, an 858% premium to peers, while generating consistent losses since inception and accumulating a $505 million deficit.

Evidence Type Describes the primary type of evidence supporting the thesis. Analytical relies on financial modeling, peer comparisons, or pattern-based inference. Documentary uses SEC filings, court records, or regulatory documents. Primary involves original investigation such as FOIA requests, interviews, site visits, or proprietary research.
AnalyticalDocumentaryPrimary

Morpheus conducted 16 interviews with industry experts, former Velo employees, and former customers, supplemented by government contracting databases (HigherGov, USASpending), court records from Indiana and Ohio, Indiana professional license filings, Velo SEC filings including the SpaceX IP license agreement, and Bloomberg peer valuation data.

Downside Catalyst Indicates whether a specific event could force the market to reprice the stock. Thesis-Only means no identifiable trigger. Pending Catalyst means a likely catalyst exists without an exact date. Specific Event means a concrete, datable event has been identified.
Pending CatalystThesis-Only

The DoW Project FORGE contract is scheduled to end in approximately 3 months with only 9% funded, and the DLA Pilot Parts Program had zero dollars obligated as of June 23, 2026; beyond these near-term contract resolution events, Morpheus argues the thesis alone (a fabricated CEO narrative, dead SpaceX relationship, and nosebleed valuation) is sufficient to force repricing.

Not Present: Specific Event


How Velo3D Makes Money

Velo3D is a California-based metal additive manufacturing company founded in 2014 that went public via a 2021 SPAC. It manufactures Sapphire-brand laser powder-bed fusion 3D printers, historically sold to customers including SpaceX, Raytheon, Honeywell, and Lockheed Martin. SpaceX was its anchor customer at IPO, representing 27.8% of revenue in 2021 and 28.4% in 2022. Revenue peaked in 2022 and declined thereafter; by September 2024 the company was delisted from NYSE and on the brink of bankruptcy. In December 2024 Arun Jeldi acquired control via a debt-for-equity exchange and launched the Rapid Production Solutions division to sell in-house printed parts.


Main Report Evidence

SpaceX Revenue Collapsed After 2022 IP License Killed Relationship

Velo's annual reports show SpaceX revenue fell from 28.4% of total revenue in 2022 to 4% in 2023 after SpaceX stopped ordering new printers, then spiked to 23% in 2024 solely due to a one-time $5 million IP license fee and $3 million services contract. Without those payments, Morpheus estimates SpaceX revenue would have been approximately $1.4 million or 3.4% of total revenue. By 2025, SpaceX revenue had fallen below the 10% concentration reporting threshold, and multiple former employees confirmed revenue from SpaceX has largely ceased since 2024.

SpaceX Revenue Concentration — Velo3D Annual Reports 2021–2025

Year SpaceX % of Total Revenue Notes
202127.8%SpaceX anchor customer at IPO
202228.4%SpaceX fleet reached 26 Sapphire printers; last year of new printer orders
20234%SpaceX stopped ordering new printers; printer count remained at 26
202423%Includes $5M one-time IP license fee + $3M services contract; ex-license est. ~$1.4M or ~3.4%
2025<10% (below reporting threshold)Fell below revenue concentration disclosure threshold

Source: Velo3D annual reports (2021–2025) and SpaceX IP License Agreement


Key Allegations

01

SpaceX Relationship Effectively Dead Since 2024

SpaceX has not purchased a new Velo printer since 2022 and its fleet has remained at 26 Sapphire printers through at least 2024, per Velo's annual reports. In October 2024, Velo sold SpaceX a perpetual, royalty-free, and irrevocable license to 100% of its IP for a one-time $5 million fee, plus a $3 million services contract, enabling SpaceX to manufacture its own printers in-house without ever paying Velo again. Three former Velo employees confirmed SpaceX now has a full manufacturing license, with one stating: 'I'd be very surprised if they ever bought another Velo system.' A fourth former employee stated: 'The reality of that is that Velo is no longer in business with SpaceX … SpaceX have found an alternative,' describing a combination of another OEM and internal software development that can produce parts previously only printable on Velo machines. A former senior leader stated: 'I think that any revenue related to SpaceX has pretty much ceased to exist since 2024.' Despite this, CEO Jeldi told an investor conference in December 2025 that 'SpaceX is actually increasing their fleet and also sending us parts to print' and that they would 'most likely' buy more machines.

02

Defense Pipeline Stuffed With Misleadingly Promoted, Unfunded Contracts

Velo's $32.6 million Department of War Project FORGE contract, announced December 2025, had only 9% funded (approximately $2.9 million) as of the report date, with the project scheduled to end in approximately 3 months and no apparent extension, per HigherGov; in March 2026 competitor Nikon SLM won a new 12-month award under the same program. The $9.8 million Defense Logistics Agency contract announced March 2026 was awarded to 24 out of 27 bidders who must further compete for a share of the total, with zero dollars obligated to Velo as of June 23, 2026, per USASpending. The $15 million RPS deal with Momentus announced April 2025 had produced zero booked revenue as of March 2026 per Velo's financial statements, and a former senior Velo leader described it as 'an effort to create a press release for us, quite frankly'; Momentus shares have fallen over 99% since its 2021 SPAC and its most recent annual report included a going concern warning.

03

Lockheed Martin Relationship Appears Completely Dead

CEO Jeldi cited Velo's relationship with Lockheed Martin at a December 2025 investor conference as evidence of its defense footprint. However, two former Velo employees told Morpheus that Lockheed 'decided to not use our product' and that 'there was such a high level of dissatisfaction from the Lockheed guys that they were just like, screw it,' attributing the loss to mismanagement of the relationship under prior Velo leadership. In April 2026, Lockheed published a write-up on its laser powder-bed fusion additive manufacturing strategy naming four 3D printing partners, including direct Velo competitors EOS and Nikon SLM, while Velo was absent. Velo's most recent annual report added new language indicating some listed blue-chip customers may now be 'prior' customers, language that did not appear in previous filings.

04

Velo Printers Plagued By Reliability Failures, Outcompeted By EOS And Nikon SLM

Multiple former Velo employees and industry experts described severe reliability deficiencies in Velo's Sapphire printers. One former employee stated that target uptime for EOS and SLM machines is 60–80%, while Velo customers were typically achieving only 20–40% uptime, with even the best customers reaching only 40–50%; EOS printers were 'pretty reliably up in the 70s.' The same employee described the Velo machine as a 'science experiment' and 'unfinished product,' noting it 'was never really designed for production.' An additive manufacturing expert who spent over a decade evaluating 3D printers for a prime defense contractor told Morpheus that Velo's printer 'tends to break down a lot' and that 'its uptime is a problem,' and confirmed that Nikon SLM's NXG model now competes directly with Velo for large-scale components. A former SpaceX employee described EOS and Nikon SLM as 'industry favorites.' Two 'barely used' Velo3D printers were listed for sale on Facebook Marketplace in January and February at a third of their original price.

05

CEO Jeldi's Biography Appears Substantially Fabricated

Jeldi refers to himself as a 'doctor' who 'practiced medicine for 3 years,' but Indiana and California license records show only a physical therapy license (Indiana No. 05009803A; Michigan No. 5501014033), and his Indiana license application discloses his highest education as a bachelor's degree in physical therapy obtained in 2004. His claimed '$50 million' healthcare company, INK Staffing, defaulted on $3.6 million in loans by August 2025, was found vacant with 'no business activity' when its lender attempted to serve a notice of default, received only 4 employee reviews (one calling the owner a 'habitual liar,' another alleging paycheck skimming), and was dissolved by Jeldi three weeks before the report's publication. His company Arrayed Additive, described as a 'leader in magnesium and 3D printing,' operates from the same vacant address as his defunct staffing firm, has no employees on LinkedIn except Jeldi himself, and former Velo employees described it as a 'shell' that 'didn't sell anything' and 'didn't make revenue.' Lite Magnesium Products, another claimed manufacturing business, has one U.S. LinkedIn employee, a website using stock photos, and was sued by two landlords for unpaid rent in June and July 2025; Jeldi also faces a March 2026 Ohio lawsuit alleging he stopped making payments under the seller financing agreement for an Ohio foundry acquisition he publicly described as a successful turnaround despite being approximately 8 months delinquent at the time. Jeldi has already pledged 3 million shares representing ~25% of his stake worth approximately $54 million as collateral for a private loan, per Velo's April 2026 proxy statement.


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